The widespread assumption is that BTB payments deliver top-line value that translates into bottom-line gains. The FCPA Professor Top Ten allows that assumption to be tested.
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Ten BTB schemes. Admitted facts. Legally committed figures. No editorial discretion.
Maintained by Professor Mike Koehler at fcpaprofessor.com – the oldest continuous FCPA information source in existence. The list is ordered by the value of the US settlement: an objective, externally determined criterion. It is updated on a rolling basis as new enforcement actions are concluded.
Every figure derives from DOJ and SEC case papers and settlement documents – admitted facts in legally binding federal resolutions.
The FCPA Professor Top Ten is not analysis or commentary. It is a record of what companies admitted, what investigators established, and what federal courts accepted.
BTB payments made against BTB gains secured – case by case.
| Case | BTB Payments | Gains Secured | Net Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| Goldman Sachs (US, 2020) | $1,600.0 m | $600.0 m | –$1,000.0 m |
| Ericsson (SE, 2019) | $150.0 m | $458.4 m | +$308.4 m |
| MTS (RU, 2019) | $420.8 m | $40.0 m | –$380.8 m |
| Siemens (DE, 2008) | $1,400.0 m | $1,100.0 m | –$300.0 m |
| Alstom (FR, 2014) | $75.0 m | $296.0 m | +$221.0 m |
| KBR/Halliburton (US, 2009) | $183.0 m | $177.0 m | –$6.0 m |
| Teva Pharma (US, 2016) | Not disclosed | Not disclosed | n/a |
| Telia (SE, 2017) | $331.2 m | $457.0 m | +$125.8 m |
| Gunvor (CH, 2024) | $97.0 m | $287.1 m | +$190.1 m |
| Glencore (CH, 2022) | $100.0 m | $272.2 m | +$172.2 m |
| Totals (nine cases) | $4,357.0 m | $3,687.7 m | –$669.3 m |
Source: FCPA Professor, Top Ten FCPA Settlements, fcpaprofessor.com, current to May 2026. Figures derived from DOJ/SEC case papers and settlement documents. All figures pre-sanction. Teva Pharma: BTB payments not available as a single agreed aggregate – excluded from totals and aggregate analysis.
These are the numbers both parties committed to under federal law. They are the basis on which the assumption can be tested.
Treated as a single body of BTB Model conduct, the dataset pays out more in BTB payments than it returns in gains.
Treating the nine disclosed cases as a single composite BTB scheme – a representation of the Buy-the-Business Model operating at scale, across multiple companies, sectors, and jurisdictions – produces a picture that the case-level data alone cannot reach.
Nine of the largest BTB schemes on record. Combined BTB payments: $4,357 m. Combined gains secured: $3,688 m. Net position: –$669 m.
Before a sanction is applied, the BTB Model does not deliver what it is widely assumed to promise.
Four of the nine BTB schemes produced a pre-sanction net loss – meaning total BTB payments exceeded the commercial gains those payments secured, before any enforcement action was taken.
Five BTB schemes produced a pre-sanction net gain. In four of those five – Ericsson, Alstom, Gunvor, and Glencore – the margin between BTB payments and gains secured was the product of a payment-to-gain ratio below 35%. In the fifth, Telia, the ratio was 72.5% – a gain, but a narrow one relative to the scale of BTB payments made.
Nine BTB schemes. More paid out in BTB payments than returned in gains – before a single sanction was applied.
The company that knows that BTB payments are not a winning proposition knows which contracts to avoid.
BTB payments – however they are recorded in the books of account – are, when reduced to their economic substance, either a Cost of Sales or an Overhead.
As a Cost of Sales, they are a cost directly attributable to securing a specific contract. They compress the gross margin on every contract they are paid to win.
As an Overhead, they are a recurring cost of operating in a market where the BTB Model is the prevailing practice. They compress the net margin across the business as a whole.
Either way, they reduce profitability – and they do so regardless of how they are characterised in the accounts.
Five BTB schemes produced a headline gain. What the BTB payments did to the margin and profitability of the underlying contracts is a different question entirely.
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